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The Intrigue of Paradigmatic Similarity: Leibniz and China
Yu Liu
In a long letter written in the last year of his life, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (16461716) notably defended the philosophical and religious conviction of China from some
Catholic missionaries. “[Far] from being blameworthy,” he proclaimed, the Chinese
“merit praise for their idea of things being created by their natural propensity and by a
pre-established harmony.”1 Because of his apparent endorsement of Chinese belief in
terms of his well-known credo, Leibniz has been viewed as “the only major philosopher
of the period to hold that the Chinese possessed a spiritualistic doctrine compatible in
some of its aspects with Christianity,”2 but he has also often been seen at the same time
as someone whose “ecumenism was not purchased at the expense of European or
Christian chauvinism.”3 “Leibniz’s standard argument,” as Roger Ariew says
representatively, “was that a particular aspect of the Chinese religion was compatible
with his own thought—and was therefore compatible with Christianity.”4
The cosmology of China is indeed strikingly similar to the metaphysics of Leibniz, but
precisely where the two resemble each other, the former is unmistakably different from
Christianity. Scholars of Leibniz have so far generally taken it for granted that he was
ideologically aligned with Christianity, but his paradigmatic similarity to China should
alert us of a surprisingly different story. Leibniz was indisputably “the greatest of the
seventeenth century sinophiles”5 and key Chinese cosmological ideas were introduced
to Europe long before he formulated his worldview. Together, these two facts can help
us decide whether he “owes to Chinese organic naturalism … a deeply important
stimulus”6 or his doctrinal affinity with China resulted merely from “[the] spontaneous
generation of similar ideas in cultures removed in time and distance from one another.”7

1

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese,” in Writings on China,
trans. Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1994), 93.
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The Metaphysics of Leibniz
As revealed by his long 1716 letter to Nicholas Remond de Montmart who incidentally
was also the confidential recipient in 1714 of The Monadology or the definitive
statement of his final philosophy, what is innovative and significant about the
metaphysics of Leibniz is the idea of things being created by their innate capacity or a
pre-established harmony which he most aptly used in his profoundly insightful and
positive interpretation of Chinese cosmology. Away from his discussions of China,
however, he largely buried this distinctive innovation under a totalizing conceptual
framework known as the best possible world. “[The] more we are enlightened and
informed in regard to the works of God,” as he alluded in 1686 to this all-encompassing
matrix of ideas early in Discourse on Metaphysics, which constituted the first
systematic pronouncement of his then still evolving mature philosophy, “the more will
we be disposed to find them excellent and conforming entirely to that which we might
desire.”8 “[Among] all the possible plans of the universe there is one better than all the
rest,” as he more palpably touched on this overarching panoramic vision in 1710 in The
Theodicy, which was the only one of his main philosophical works published in his
lifetime, “and … God has not failed to choose it.”9 “[In] creating the universe,” as he
most clearly said in 1714 in “The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason”
which, no less than The Monadology, embodied his final philosophical manifesto,
“[God] has chosen the best possible plan, in which there is the greatest variety together
with the greatest order; the best arranged ground, place, time; the most results produced
in the most simple ways; the most of power, knowledge, happiness and goodness in the
creatures that the universe could permit.”10
With God being characterized prominently as the raison d'être of everything and with
the anthropomorphized divine personage being imagined implicitly as all powerful and
all beneficent, the world simply could not have been other than the best of all possible
alternatives. Even though the undeniable presence of evil made it easy in the 18th
century for Voltaire (1694-1778) to satirize in Candide the theocentric optimism of
Leibniz, his all-embracing metaphysical frame of reference centered on a supernatural
agent is, as Nicholas Jolley astutely points out, “not the complacent nonsense that it
appears to be.”11 If anything, its pedigree started long before Leibniz.

8

Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], in Leibniz: Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 291.
9
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E.M. Huggard (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), 268.
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528.
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It is Plato (427 BCE-347 BCE) who in Timaeus first described the world as emerging
miraculously out of chaotic disorder at the hands of a reformist deity who “put
intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest
work in the order of nature.”12 Since the divine artificer “was good, and … being free
from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as possible,” as the
eponymous hero of Plato’s work explained it to Socrates, “the world became a living
soul and truly rational through the providence of God.”13
Even though in The Republic, The Symposium, and other works Plato had unequivocally
disparaged the phenomenal world of becoming as transient, ever-changing, and illusive
and glorified the noumenal world of being in contrast as eternal, constant, and true, he
surprisingly moderated the antithetical evaluation of his dualistic vision momentarily
in Timaeus via what Arthur O. Lovejoy perceptively calls “a bold logical inversion”14
by binding up the ideal with the real as near equivalences in a tight and inseparable
relationship of cause and effect.
On the basis of the Platonic Good and the related principle of plenitude explaining the
rich and divergent emanation of the multifarious from the originally singular one,
Aristotle (384BC-322BC) built his theory of four causalities and his hierarchically
structured and downwardly graded great chain of being (scala naturae). After being
synthesized with Stoicism by Plotinus (204-270), this part of European humanist
antiquity was eventually absorbed into the rationalist theology of European
scholasticism. The Platonic and Neo-Platonic myth of the world as being created or
recreated from disorder to order by a highly artistically-minded supernatural agent was
noticeably different from the doctrinal belief of Judeo-Christianity which involved the
divine seven-day creation of the world out of nothing, the history of humanity
descending from Adam and Eve, and the cosmic warfare of Christ against Satan.
However, the former nevertheless provided a most useful complementary service for
the latter with the theocentric orientation of its logic and the easy amenability of its
cosmological claims to monotheism. In Candide, Voltaire singled out Leibniz for
attack, but the best possible world scenario was never the idiosyncratic vagary of any
individual person. When poking fun at Leibniz, Voltaire was therefore consciously
taking to task the entire theistic heritage of Europe.

12

Plato, Timaeus, in Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Barnes & Noble,
2007), 30.
13
Plato, Timaeus, 29 and 30.
14
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1960), 49.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

3

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 77 [2017], No. 77, Art. 5

22

Number 77, Fall 2017

As part of his Lutheran upbringing, Leibniz was introduced to the usual theocentric
tradition of European philosophy and religion when he started attending one of his
hometown Leipzig’s two main Latin schools at the age of seven. The strictly
propaedeutic mission of that educational establishment meant no special facility in or
encouragement to any in-depth study of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, or music, but
the emphasis of the curriculum on grammar (Latin and Greek), rhetoric, and logic
helped as much to seed a lifelong habit of seeing things theistically by reference to a
singular original cause as to provide him with the necessary linguistic tools for learning
about those ancient European writers who were most exemplary in connecting rational
thinking with theism.
Even before his formal schooling, he had already been guided informally into the
European world of learning centered on God by his father Friedrich Leubnitz (15971652) who was a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Leipzig and who
had great expectations for his precocious son. Leibniz lost his father when he was only
six years old, but one year after his father’s death, he gained free access to the family
library which, beyond the philosophical books of his father and the legal books of his
maternal grandfather Wilhelm Schmuch (1575-1634), included a great deal of
ideologically indiscriminate material left behind by Bartholomäus Voigt, father of his
father’s second wife Dorothea Voigt (?-1643) and a bookseller and publisher in Leipzig.
Unsupervised and unstructured, his entirely fortuitous exploration of writers, often at
doctrinal variance with each other, enabled him to mythologize himself later as an
autodidact and to evolve his characteristic eclecticism in theistic thinking.
At the University of Leipzig and long afterwards, Leibniz subsequently continued his
intellectual apprenticeship in the theocentric tradition of European philosophy and
religion. From writers of European antiquity and their Renaissance revival, he
progressed in time to scholastic philosophy and theology and their revisions in the
Reformation, ending finally with the brave new ideas of the modern period. In turn he
was exhilarated, but the sequentially late attraction of the new complicated rather than
erased his earlier attachment to the old. During his fateful stay in Paris from 1672 to
1676, for instance, the geometrically phrased new teaching of René Descartes (15961650) decisively inspired his intense interest in mathematics and logic while helping to
wean him from the heavily Aristotelian scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
and from the materialist philosophy of Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679).
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No matter how he was then captivated by the mechanistic worldview of Cartesianism,
however, he never lost his affection for the old cosmology of Platonism and NeoPlatonism. With the God-centered theory of the best possible world, he doubtlessly
wished to accommodate as much the past and the present of his formative influences as
the ancients and the moderns of his intellectual heritage. However, as will be shown
later, in relation to his true metaphysical innovation, his attempt at such an
accommodation within the existing parameters of European philosophy and religion
worked out mostly as an elaborate cover.
The Reconciliation of the Old and the New
Leibniz was born two years before the end of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).
Confined initially to a religiously instigated regional revolt within the Holy Roman
Empire, the hostilities had quickly spilled over into a full-blown pan-European conflict,
embroiling most of the major European powers and inflicting unprecedented pain and
devastation from protracted military violence and collateral famines and diseases. As
much as the unusual exposure to doctrinal diversity in his father’s library at a young
and impressionable age and the subsequent influence of teachers at the University of
Leipzig such as Jakob Thomasius (1622-1684) who strove to synthesize the
scholastically mediated classical philosophy with the fundamental tenets of Lutheran
theology, the historical circumstance of Leibniz’s birth in a world debilitatingly
fragmented but yearning for unity and peace contributed to the development of his
characteristic inclination for open-minded reconciliation and eclecticism.
Even in his youth, as a recent biographer of him points out, he already saw it as the
mission of his life “to put the pieces together to achieve a universal synthesis for the
glory of God and the happiness of mankind.”15 When he came to formulate his mature
philosophy later in life, it was not surprising that he spared no effort in showing off his
continuing desire in this direction and in making it perceived by others as what he was
doing.
Within his theocentric theory of the best possible world, he managed to make peace
between writers who were objectionable to each other. “[The] writings of distinguished
men of ancient as of modern times,” as he wrote in 1695 in Specimen Dynamicum,
“apart from their too sharp polemics against opposing thinkers, contain for the most
part much that is true and good and what well deserves to be excerpted and deposited
in the common treasury of knowledge.”16 For his ostensible purpose of intellectual and
ideological irenicism, he was particularly interested in discovering common ground
between the ancients and the moderns of his European heritage.
15

Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 66.
16
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Both inspired and emboldened by revolutionary changes in Post-Renaissance
astronomy and physics, the mathematically based new teaching of Descartes had
daringly challenged the scholastically filtered old thinking of European antiquity by
demanding to explain everything in terms of the sequential logic of causal relations. In
its turn, it had opened itself to attacks from defenders of the old because of its suspected
tendency to atheist materialism and its apparent inability to deal with issues such as the
coordination of the body and the soul. Rather than taking sides in the heated dispute,
Leibniz went between the old and the new. “It appears more and more clear that
although all the particular phenomena of nature can be explained mathematically or
mechanically by those who understand them,” as he said in Discourse on Metaphysics,
“yet nevertheless, the general principles of corporeal nature and even of mechanics are
metaphysical rather than geometric, and belong rather to certain indivisible forms or
natures as the causes of the appearances, than to the corporeal mass or to extension.”17
Here as elsewhere, the logical and rhetorical maneuver of Leibniz’s argument was, first
of all, to expose the deficiency of the moderns so as to cut down to size their proud
achievement, but the very fact of him attempting this already implied significant prior
recognition of what the moderns had claimed for themselves. In the same complex way,
Leibniz defended the honor of the ancients so as to direct attention to their enduring
usefulness, but in the study of nature he conspicuously limited this usefulness to
metaphysics and this limitation could not but give implicit validation to some of the
ideological challenges which the ancients had received from the moderns.
At once critical and appreciative though in different ways, Leibniz never shied away
from differences between the old and the new of his intellectual inheritance, but he
deftly chose to construe the differences as indicating a relationship of complement
rather than irreconcilable conflict or contradiction. So far as he could see, the moderns
were preoccupied with the mechanical explanation of specific natural phenomena or the
study of efficient causes, while the ancients were concerned with the metaphysical
understanding of underlying reasons or the consideration of final causes. “Both
explanations are good;” as he said conciliatorily in Discourse on Metaphysics, “both
are useful not only for the admiring of the work of a great artificer, but also for the
discovery of useful facts in physics and medicine.”18
Through a sort of division of labor or a conceptual sleight of hand, Leibniz brought the
ancients and the moderns together under his theocentric canopy of the best possible
world. Rather than embodying something innovative, however, this very reconciliation
of the old and the new exposed problems with the existing framework of his intellectual
heritage which to all appearances he was espousing.

17
18

Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, 317.
Ibid., 321.
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To be specific, the notions of efficient and final causes which he used respectively to
delineate the quasi-separate spheres of influence for the moderns and the ancients were
both derived from what Aristotle in Metaphysics called “knowledge of the first
causes.”19 In Physics, Aristotle identified the efficient cause as the third of the four
causalities and presented it as having to do with “the primary source of the change or
coming to rest; … and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change
of what is changed.”20 Classifying the final cause as the last of the four causalities,
Aristotle described it in contrast as understandable “in the sense of end or ‘that for the
sake of which’ a thing is done.”21 Alike, the efficient and final causes were ultimately
about a primordial original cause which, as the singular unchanging external source of
the changing multifarious inside the world, had to be understood theistically, but in the
quotidian exercise of this logical thinking which emphasized the distinction of before
and after, the invocation of the final cause could potentially or actually cause confusion
for the application of the efficient cause and vice versa. With Aristotle, as with Leibniz,
it is this actual or potential confusion which made these two causalities problematic
alike.
In Physics, for instance, Aristotle explained the final cause via a situation involving the
activity of walking about and the state of being healthy. Insofar as the state of being
healthy could be perceived as an end or goal while the activity of walking about could
be seen as the means or instrument to achieve that end or goal, the former could be
considered as the final cause of the latter. “[Health],” as Aristotle said in Physics, “is
the cause of walking about.”22
The problem with this way of logical analysis is that the relationship between the state
of being healthy and the activity of walking about could also be explained by the
efficient cause so that the activity of walking about was the prior cause while the state
of being healthy was the subsequent effect or result, but the invocation of the final cause
decidedly overturned this temporal sequence of causal relations and consequently made
the very concepts of before and after or cause and effect potentially or actually
confusing. In the 17th century it is this kind of potential or actual confusion which drew
the critical attention of Spinoza (1632-1667) who, in the process of formulating his
radically new philosophy, dismissed all final causes as “nothing but human fictions”
and characterized the ultimate identification of the final cause with divinity as “[taking]
refuge in the will of God, i.e., the sanctuary of ignorance.”23
19

Aristotle, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1966), 983a.
20
Aristotle, Physics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House,
1941), Bk. II, Ch.3, 194b.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Spinoza, Ethics, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. I, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985), 442 and 443.
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Just as Spinoza targeted Aristotle in his criticism of the final cause, so Voltaire set his
satirical focus on Leibniz in his repudiation of the same idea. “Observe: noses were
made to support spectacles,” as he had his fictional character Pangloss say in an
obviously ludicrous way in Candide, “hence we have spectacles.”24 “Legs, as anyone
can plainly see, were made to be breeched,” as the plainly misguided philosophical
teacher of Voltaire’s creation went on to remark idiotically, “and so we have
breeches.”25 “Stones were made to be shaped and to build castles with;” as he concluded
his ridiculous mini-lecture about the idea of an end for everything in the best possible
world to his pupil Candide, “thus My Lord has a fine castle, for the greatest Baron in
the province should have the finest house; and since pigs were made to be eaten, we eat
pork all year round.”26
From this kind of attacks Voltaire lodged against him or Spinoza launched against
Aristotle, Leibniz was in reality largely immune, but it was so only because his
discussion of the final cause was always vague and he never quite made clear what
specific end was achieved through what specific means in his cosmological thinking.
“There seems to be no followable route from Leibniz’s basic metaphysic to the notion
of doing something for the sake of an end,” as Jonathan Bennett says incisively, “let
alone the more fully teleological notion of doing something because one thinks it will
lead to a certain end.”27
The Metaphysical Innovation of Leibniz
Rather than the reconciliation of the old and the new within the existing boundaries of
his intellectual heritage, what was truly innovative about the metaphysics of Leibniz
was, as pointed out earlier, the idea of things being created by their natural propensity
or a pre-established harmony which he used most aptly in his profoundly insightful and
positive interpretation of Chinese cosmology. “[Every] soul,” as he said as early as
1686, “is as a world apart, independent of everything else but God.”28

24

Voltaire, Candide or Optimism, trans. and ed. Robert M. Adams (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 2.
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Jonathan Bennett, “Leibniz’s Two Realms,” in Leibniz: Nature and Freedom, ed. Donald Rutherford
and J.A. Cover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 135-155, 139.
28
Leibniz, “Identity in Individuals and True Propositions” (1686), in Leibniz: Selections, 97.
25

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/5

8

Liu: The Intrigue of Paradigmatic Similarity: Leibniz and China

Comparative Civilizations Review

27

By itself, the idea of every predicate being necessarily included in the subject (principle
of sufficient reason) was not new, since it was closely related to the notion of ex nihilo
nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing) which was a major pillar of Aristotelian logic
and a crucial part of scholasticism, but it became innovative in Leibniz’s use of it,
because he not only extended the implied notion of self-sufficiency to the totality of
subjects to which all predicates belonged but also did it in a very unusual way. “[Every]
substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe in accordance with its own
viewpoint or relationship to the rest,” as he proclaimed in the same 1686 treatise, “so
that all are in perfect correspondence with one another.”29 Free from external
compulsion, each thing was independent. Rather than engendering chaos, this
independence ensured the good and mutually beneficial coordination of everything.
“God,” as Leibniz wrote in 1695, “has from the first created the soul or any other real
unity in such a way that everything arises in it from its own internal nature through a
perfect spontaneity relatively to itself, and yet with a perfect conformity to external
things.”30
The world was never without order, but the order resulted from the independent state
and action of everything rather than any immediately discernible external
determination. More than anything, this unusual notion of things being free
individually but well-coordinated collectively at the same time in their independent
relationship distinguished Leibniz from his contemporaries in a competition of ideas.
In addition to being unable to explain any meaningful interaction between the body and
the soul, as mentioned before, the dualistic vision of Descartes had opened itself to the
accusation of atheist materialism. To remedy this situation, Nicholas Malebranche
(1638-1715) developed the doctrine of Occasionalism so that the body and the soul
could impact each other, but the cause was always external and ultimately a singular
and personal God who continuously intervened to bring about the miraculous result. To
confront the same problem but away from the mechanistic worldview of Cartesianism,
Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688) and Henry More (1614-1687) drew on Plato’s concept of
world soul or its Neo-Platonist variation and enrichment and came up with the vitalist
idea of plastic nature which supposedly acted “as a Subordinate Instrument of Divine
Providence, in the Orderly disposal of Matter.”31 Leibniz roundly rejected the
involvement of miracles or divine interventions (direct or indirect) in the explanation
of nature, thereby clearing the way for his metaphysical innovation.

29

Ibid., 98.
Leibniz, “New System of Nature and of the Communication of Substances,” in Leibniz: Selections,
114.
31
Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678), 178.
30
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From the Cartesians (Malebranche) and the Cambridge Neo-Platonists (Cudworth and
More), Leibniz differed superficially only in limiting the role of the deity to before the
creation of everything so that the world was still a supernaturally-made machine or
watch or automaton but everything in it always ran in perfect order and nothing ever
required any supernatural adjustment or maintenance. In reality, the palpable autonomy
of the world in its actual operation from any direct control of a supernatural agent
implied that the world was an organism rather than a machine and as such it cried out
for a cosmological explanation which involved a significantly different
conceptualization of divinity and a significantly different understanding of causality.
Even though things could and did impact each other, for instance, why everything was
the way it was could not be explained ultimately by the usual efficient causes. Even
though things could be related to each other in terms of means and ends, the routine
coordination between them could not be understood ultimately by the usual final causes.
Since freedom or self-determination was as characteristic of each individual thing as of
the totality to which all things belonged, in other words, neither the operation of
everything individually nor its independently well-coordinated cooperation with
everything else was explainable by the Cartesian idea of mechanism or the Platonically
mediated Judeo-Christian notion of teleology.
Being free, the activity of everything individually or in its cooperation with everything
else was contingent, but being conducive to the well-being of each thing and the totality
of all things alike, the same activity was also necessary. Both contingent and necessary
at the same time rather than either the one or the other, the paradoxical sounding
causality cannot but push the search for the ultimate explanation right inside the
operation of the world rather than outside it and cast light in the process on the
intricacies of Leibniz’s theistic attitude. In public, he never stopped touting himself as
a staunch defender of a unified Christian church and he always prompted others to
perceive him as such under his theocentric rubric of the best possible world. In private,
however, as reported after his death by Johann Georg von Eckhart (1664-1730) who
was his secretary during the last nineteen years of his life, he was never more than a
nominal Christian who rarely went to church and never took communion. Around the
House of Hanover he was widely known as a non-believer, being nicknamed Loewenix or “believer in nothing.” Even on his deathbed in 1716, he rejected repeated appeals
of Eckhart to allow a priest to come and give him the last sacraments, and he reportedly
protested both angrily and rhetorically by asking what he should confess since he had
stolen or taken from no one.
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Just as his habitual use of the efficient and final causes for the reconciliation of the
ancients and the moderns provided no real insight into the innovation of his cosmology,
so his customary parade of ideas supposedly taken from European antiquity generally
obscured rather than clarified the real and radical import of his inspiration. In The
Monadology, the most eye-catching and seemingly most important word is of course
monad which in the plural he defined notoriously as entities which “have no windows
through which anything can enter or depart.”32 This account of the monads has been
most appropriately characterized by Bertrand Russell as “a kind of fantastic fairy tale,
coherent perhaps, but wholly arbitrary.”33 Other allegedly ancient ideas he invoked are
not as bewilderingly mystifying, but they do not obfuscate things any the less. Entelechy
or entelechies, for instance, is a term which he was fond of throwing around and which
he explained in 1695 as meaning “primitive Forces which do not contain only the act
or the complement of possibility, but further an original activity.”34 Here, as if
providing an etymological origin for his notion of things being created by their natural
propensity, he was willy-nilly reminiscent of Cudworth and More who had resorted to
similar concepts of vitalism for the explanation of nature and for the related
understanding of an external God.
In reality, Leibniz differed drastically from the Cambridge Neo-Platonists because what
was most important in his innovative vision of the world was not how everything was
divinely animated to operate predictably in a downwardly spiraling chain of being but
how everything was independent of everything else in their well-coordinated
cooperation and how this independent correlation cannot be easily understood by
reference to the externally conceptualized God of Judeo-Christianity or the similarly
understood Demiurge of Plato and Aristotle.
In light of his true metaphysical innovation, both Leibniz’s habitual promotion of the
efficient and final causes within the theocentric theory of the best possible world and
his routine parade of ideas supposedly taken from European antiquity can be seen as
largely and even intentionally red herrings. Rather than identifying him ideologically
with his intellectual and religious heritage as is still generally and problematically
assumed today, they most importantly provided him with a convenient defensive or
self-defensive cover so that he was iconoclastic while being shielded somewhat from
any accusation of heresy. “It was necessary,” as he wrote in “New System of Nature
and of the Communication of Substances,” “… to recall and, so to speak, rehabilitate
the substantial forms so decried today, but in a way which would make them intelligible
and which would separate the use we should make of them from the abuse that has been
made of them.”35
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In the name of resurrecting moribund old ideas, he then went on to be daringly
revolutionary about a brave new world which was organic rather than mechanistic or
vitalistic. The new may still sound like being closely connected with the old, but the
connection was much more in rhetoric than in substance. To see this, it is crucially
important to take note of “an astonishing correlation [of his ideas] with various schools
of Chinese thought”36 which, from time to time, has been pointed out but which has not
so far received adequate attention.
The Paradigmatic Similarity to China
In the 20th century the person who most influentially pointed out the striking
resemblance between the metaphysics of Leibniz and the cosmology of China was
Joseph Needham. For Needham, the key to this resemblance is the historical context.
As mentioned earlier, Leibniz developed his metaphysical thinking in the late 17th and
early 18th centuries in response to Malebranche on the one hand and to Cudworth and
More on the other. No matter how different from each other in their accounts of the
communication between the body and the soul, the mechanistic worldview of
Cartesianism and the vitalistic cosmology of Cambridge Neo-Platonism were at the
same time similar to one another in the theistic orientation of their efforts and in their
consequently questionable attribution of the ultimate cause (be it efficient or final) to
the idea of God who was conceptualized as singular, personal, and existing outside the
natural process. With his notion of things being made by their innate capacity or a preestablished harmony, Leibniz not only kept any direct supernatural intervention away
from his explanation of nature but also changed the European understanding of the
world from a machine to an organism. It is in the stunning success of this quietly
iconoclastic effort to surmount “the characteristic European schizophrenia or splitpersonality” or “to overcome the European antinomy between theological vitalism and
mechanical materialism”37 that Leibniz most vividly and ineluctably reminded
Needham of China.
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To Needham, Leibniz’s metaphysical innovation is particularly reminiscent of the
Chinese Daoist worldview. In the human body, as the famous Daoist philosopher
Zhuangzi (369 BCE-286 BCE) once explained it by way of an example, there were nine
openings, six organs, and hundreds of joints which came together and kept good order,
but being uncompelled, the good coordination of the bodily parts did not result from
their being commanded in any way. “The hands and feet differ in their duties;” as two
Chinese scholars annotated Zhuangzi’s idea in the third century, “the five viscera differ
in their functions.”38 “They never associate with each other,” as the two scholars
quickly pointed out, “yet the hundred parts (of the body) are held together with them in
a common unity.”39 “They never (force themselves to) cooperate,” as they went on to
say, “and yet, both within and without, all complete one another.”40 “This is the way in
which they cooperate in non-cooperation,” as they concluded, “… Heaven and Earth
are such a (living) body.”41
To protect himself from any accusation of atheist heresy, Leibniz understandably
invoked the idea of God, but the essence of his metaphysical innovation, like the Daoist
worldview, consisted in what Needham calls “a kind of harmony of wills” or “a system
of correlative thinking,”42 and his habitual invocation of the deity was not only largely
perfunctory but also helped in that way to highlight his paradigmatic similarity to the
Chinese Daoists. “It would seem,” as Zhuangzi said about the cooperation of the bodily
parts in their independent relationship, “as though there must be some True Lord among
them.”43 “But whether I succeed in discovering his identity or not,” as he pointed out
bluntly, “it neither adds to nor detracts from his Truth.”44
In the history of modern science since the late 17th century, organism is arguably the
single most important idea which liberated Western conceptual thinking from the
Cartesian and Newtonian understanding of the universe as a machine and consequently
enabled drastic and revolutionary advances in field physics and evolutionary chemistry
and biology. As early as the third century BCE, Chinese Daoist philosophers like
Zhuangzi already talked about the idea.
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The decisive breakthrough of modern science was not achieved in China, and why this
did not happen is intriguing and important for any study of modern Chinese history, but
the crucial and indispensable idea of organism which made possible the scientific
revolution of the modern world was characteristically Chinese rather than European and
it was indisputably introduced in the early 17th century to Europe from China by Jesuit
missionaries who, furthermore, made crystal clear its fundamental difference from
European theistic and secular logical thinking by repudiating it.
In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Leibniz was among the very first European
philosophers to think about the world innovatively as organic rather than mechanistic
or vitalistic. He has since been followed by a very long line of Western thinkers going
all the way to Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) in the 20th century, but in his day
could Leibniz have taken his inspiration from the Chinese organismic worldview which
was then verifiably accessible to him?
Needham apparently believed that Leibniz owed a crucially important inspirational debt
to China. “[Leibniz’s] own, the first, great attempt at a synthesis, which should
surmount the dichotomy of either theological vitalist idealism or mechanical
materialism,” as he put it, “was strongly stimulated by, if not indeed derived from, the
organic world-outlook which we have found to be characteristically Chinese.”45 Before
Needham, other scholars of China already drew attention to various points of contact
between Leibniz and China. In 1687, for instance, Leibniz had in his possession a copy
of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus which Jesuit missionaries to China published that
year and which, in addition to three Confucian classics in Latin translation, included a
lengthy discussion of the greatest Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and
his organismic theory of Li (principle) and Qi (material energy) which was known to
have been heavily influenced by Daoism and Buddhism. In 1689, Leibniz met in Rome
Jesuit missionary to China Claudio Filippo Grimaldi (1638-1712) to whom he
subsequently sent a list of thirty questions about a wide range of topics concerning
China. In 1697, Leibniz also started a correspondence with Jesuit missionary to China
Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730) which continued for several years. Needham knew all
these facts and more, but, as he readily admitted, none of these could have proved any
decisive influence, because “all the essentials of [Leibniz’s] system were worked out in
the Discourse on Metaphysics (written in the winter of 1685-86), the terminology of
monads being alone missing.”46
Chronologically, as implicitly acknowledged by Needham, it is plainly not the case that
Leibniz first studied Chinese cosmology consciously and then evolved his metaphysical
innovation. In his day, Leibniz was accused of plagiarizing Newton in the development
of the infinitesimal calculus. Leibniz strongly denied it and he was later largely
vindicated.
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During his correspondence with Joachim Bouvet beginning in the late 1690s, Leibniz
was amazed to find resemblance between his binary arithmetic and the hexagrams of
the ancient Chinese classic Yijing (Book of Changes), and so far there has been no
evidence that the resemblance was anything other than coincidence.
However, the case with organism is different. For his difficulty to link Leibniz’s
iconoclastic worldview with his knowledge of Chinese philosophy, Needham’s
attribution of Leibniz’s inspiration to China has been rightly challenged by David
Mungello, but in the context of the fact that organism was a characteristically Chinese
idea and was circulated in Europe before Leibniz even began to philosophize,
Mungello’s explanation of Leibniz’s paradigmatic similarity to China as “[the]
spontaneous generation of similar ideas in cultures removed in time and distance from
one another”47 is in its turn highly problematic, especially because his speculated
independence of Leibniz from China has since been used implicitly by some recent
scholars to deny the reality of Leibniz’s ideological affinity with the Far East and to
perversely characterize his insightful and positive interpretation of Chinese cosmology
in the long 1716 letter as, at worst, part of a show of “European or Christian
chauvinism,”48 and, at best, a misguided display of “hermeneutic generosity.”49 Leibniz
may not have studied the organismic idea of China consciously until very late in his
life, but long before that he could have absorbed it without knowing it consciously. The
crucial clue for this is his long 1716 letter.
The Chinese Connection of Leibniz
The long letter of Leibniz to Remond in 1716 contained his most important thoughts
about Chinese cosmology, but the thoughts were given in the form of a carefully
measured response to the separate discussions of the same topic by two Catholic
missionaries to China: Nicholas Longobardi (1565-1655) and Antonio Caballero a
Santa Maria (1602-1669). A Jesuit and a Franciscan respectively, both Longobardi and
Santa Maria were important in the history of the early modern East-West intellectual
interaction and in any study of Leibniz because of their principled and spirited
opposition to the legacy of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) who pioneered the evangelical
enterprise of the Catholic Church in the Middle Kingdom.
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From Macao, Ricci first entered the Chinese mainland and founded the Jesuit China
mission in 1583. After years of study about the Chinese language and Chinese culture,
he gradually came to recognize the special importance of Confucianism which was
dominant in Chinese society both ideologically and politically. To win official
acceptance or at least tolerance, Ricci simply had to befriend Confucianism, but to
advance his apostolic agenda, he also had to distance himself from the official Chinese
ideology and repudiate it at the same time. Out of the contradictory needs of this
situation evolved eventually his carefully calculated strategy of evangelism which had
two main components: acceptance of ancient Confucianism as prefiguring Christian
monotheism and rejection of Neo-Confucianism as corrupted by Daoism and
Buddhism.
Ricci’s complex attitude of simultaneous acceptance and rejection toward
Confucianism inaugurated a longstanding Western prejudicial view of the Chinese as
being acquainted with ethics or natural theology but “[having] no conception of the
rules of logic” and “[having] obscured matters by the introduction of error rather than
enlightened them.”50 To a large extent, Leibniz’s surprising neglect of Chinese
metaphysical thinking reflected this. As early as 1667, as he revealed it in a letter to
Landgrave Ernst von Hessen Rheinfels, he was already intrigued by China.
So eager was he to lay his hands on everything about the Far East that he proudly
boasted to the Electress Sophia Charlotte (1668-1705) in 1697 that he should post a
notice on his door: Bureau of Information for Chinese Knowledge. In spite of his wellknown consuming interest, there were always blind spots up to the late 1690s. “His
interests extended beyond collecting data,” as Franklin Perkins says recently while
echoing Mungello’s doubt about Needham’s attribution of Leibniz’s metaphysical
inspiration to China but overlooking Mungello’s simultaneous recognition of Leibniz’s
real paradigmatic similarity to the Far East, “but did not extend to philosophy.”51 When
Leibniz wrote toward the end of the 17th century about the need of Europe for
missionaries from the Chinese “who might teach us the use and practice of natural
religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology,”52 his underlying
assumption about the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese and European
philosophical and religious paradigms was still largely informed by Ricci.
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Not until the late 1690s or early 1700s did Leibniz realize that the supposed weakness
of the Chinese in having no conception of the rules of logic and in having obscured
metaphysical thinking by the introduction of errors was a Jesuit code phrase for the idea
of organism for which Ricci denigrated Chinese philosophy but in which Leibniz found
his closest affinity with the Middle Kingdom. Long before he achieved that realization,
Longobardi and Santa Maria already prepared that process by challenging Ricci. For
his purpose of both endorsing and attacking the dominant Chinese ideology, in
particular, Ricci claimed to have detected in ancient Confucianism monotheistic
tendencies which were then lost in Neo-Confucianism under the corrupting influence
of Daoism and Buddhism.
Because of his ostensible acceptance of ancient Confucianism, Ricci has been
celebrated as epitomizing what Wolfgang Reinhard calls “one of the few serious
alternatives to the otherwise brutal ethno-centrism of the European expansion over the
earth.”53 In reality, his monotheistic reading of ancient Chinese texts was nothing more
than what Edward Said terms “a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern
over the Orient.”54 No matter how he seemed to be inclusive in his ambiguous
accommodation of Christianity to Confucianism, his supposedly inclusive reading of
Confucianism was actually exclusive because, as Urs App perceptively points out, “it
also hijacked other people’s histories and religions and embedded them in a
fundamentally biblical scenario.”55
Longobardi was one of the very first in the small Jesuit China mission to be critical of
Ricci’s specious division of Confucianism into a pristine early part and a degenerate
later part. Entering China in 1597 and staying in the country until his death in 1655, he
knew that the organismic worldview was not limited to Daoism or Buddhism but was
the crucial cornerstone of a productive relationship of concurrent competition and
complement among the three main philosophical and religious traditions of the Middle
Kingdom. Ricci was aware of Longobardi’s criticism. Before his death in 1610, he
could have meant to acknowledge its validity quietly and to silence it at the same time
when he promoted Longobardi to be his successor as the leader of the Jesuit China
mission.
Longobardi did not stay loyal and submissive to the legacy of Ricci for long. Soon after
Ricci’s death, he started an internal Jesuit debate about Ricci’s dubious reading of
Confucianism, and as one of Ricci’s most vocal critics, he also wrote a long and feisty
treatise. Things did not go his way in the debate and he was even ordered to have his
treatise destroyed, but his anti-Ricci text was leaked out and Santa Maria was the one
who got it and made it possible for it to be published in Europe.
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On the basis of Longobardi’s information, Santa Maria also wrote out his opposition to
Ricci. Both of these texts were sent by Remond to Leibniz for a response, but before
Leibniz wrote his long 1716 letter, there is evidence that he not only already knew the
contents of the two treatises but also already put two and two together about his
paradigmatic similarity to China.
The doctrinal fight Longobardi and Santa Maria had with Ricci was over the Chinese
idea of tianren heyi (humanity’s unity with heaven) or wanwu yiti (ten thousand things
in one body) which Leibniz dealt with in the most important first two parts of his 1716
letter (the last two parts treated Confucian rites and the similarity of his binary
arithmetic to the hexagrams of Yijing). Ricci first discussed the Chinese idea in the
early 17th century when he described the Chinese as believing “that the entire universe
is composed of a common substance; that the creator of the universe is one in a
continuous body, a continuum as it were, together with heaven and earth, men and
beasts, trees and plants, and the four elements, and that each individual thing is a
member of this body.”56 For the tactical maneuvers of his proselytizing enterprise,
Ricci willfully characterized the view as a Daoist and Buddhist corruption of NeoConfucianism, but relying on testimonies of Chinese scholar-officials either friendly or
hostile to Ricci, Longobardi and Santa Maria proved that it was a fundamental belief
always shared by Confucianism with Daoism and Buddhism. Just as European
mechanistic and vitalistic views of nature both distinguished God clearly from
everything else, so all three Chinese philosophical and religious traditions considered
everything in the universe in contrast as intertwined with heaven because the latter as
an ever on-going organic process was actualized only in the independent exercise of a
cooperative principle by each participant and because “Heaven and Earth … are void
of Reason, that is, of Will and Deliberation, but do all things by a certain natural
Propension.”57
In the form of tianren heyi (humanity’s unity with heaven) or wanwu yiti (ten thousand
things in one body), the organismic worldview of China was apparently absorbed into
the monistic philosophy of Spinoza in the middle of the 17th century. Spinoza is not
widely recognized today as a Sinophile, but when he was expelled from his synagogue
in 1656, he was reportedly accused of teaching children of the Jewish Sabbath school
“that the Bible was not the history of the world, that Chinese history was independent
of biblical history, and so on”58 and his Latin teacher Van den Enden (1602-1674) is
known to have believed “that nature had to be considered the only God.”59 Between
1619 and 1633 Van den Enden was a Jesuit.
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To the European public, China was then the pride of the Jesuit missionary effort outside
Europe, but behind closed doors, debates about the Chinese organismic cosmology were
raging between Ricci’s supporters and detractors and both sides sent their views back
to their Jesuit superiors and confreres in Europe. With his insider’s information, Van
den Enden evidently played a most instrumental role in the formulation of Spinoza’s
radical philosophy which, reminiscent of the Chinese organismic idea of humanity’s
free and entirely voluntary conformity with heaven, conceptualized the highest ideal of
life as freedom or “a firm existence, which our intellect acquires through immediate
union with God, so that it can produce ideas in itself, and outside itself effects agreeing
well with its nature, without its effects being subjected, however, to any external causes
by which they can be changed or transformed.”60
Leibniz’s substantive contact with the organismic conviction of China was via Spinoza.
On the way from Paris to the Court of Hanover in 1676, he made a special detour to
The Hague and met the Dutch philosopher in person for at least three days and possibly
a week. Before that momentous encounter, he had already learned diligently about the
main contents of Spinoza’s monistic philosophy in 1675 in Paris from Walther
Ehrenfried von Tschirnhaus (1651-1708), a mathematician and fellow German
compatriot, who had earned the trust and respect of Spinoza in 1674 and had been given
extracts by Spinoza from his then unpublished masterpiece the Ethics. “In a
philosophical as well as a literal sense,” as Matthew Stewart points out in a recent study
of the two European philosophers, “Spinoza opened a door for Leibniz.”61 Leibniz did
not seem to have any idea then of any possible connection of Spinoza with the Far East,
but in the late 1690s he could not have remained unaware of it, because Pierre Bayle
(1647-1708) had already drawn public attention to the similarity of Spinoza to the
doctrinal beliefs of Chinese Buddhism and to what he called “[a] hypothesis, that is
very much in vogue among the Chinese”62 by which he meant Neo-Confucianism. In
Theodicy published in 1710, Leibniz alluded to Bayle’s reference to Chinese Buddhism
when he described how the belief about the annihilation of all things belonging to us
was shared by the Quietists of Europe and “the Quietism of Foë, originator of a great
Chinese sect,”63 but he did not mention Bayle’s concurrent reference to Confucianism
or Neo-Confucianism. Given the reputation of Spinoza as a materialist and atheist
philosopher and the need of protection for himself, Leibniz’s omission could not have
been accidental.
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In a short piece about the civil cult of Confucius written in 1700/1701, Leibniz first
mentioned Longobardi by name and showed knowledge of the internal Jesuit debate
about the nature of Chinese metaphysics. He claimed then that he did not “know if it is
sufficiently clear what in fact is the authentic doctrine of the Chinese literati (especially
of the classical ones), officially approved, based on their classical texts,” but he quickly
supported Ricci by praising him as “a great man, for following the example of the
Church Fathers who interpreted Plato and other philosophers in a Christian fashion.”64
In another short piece about Chinese rites and religion written in 1708, he more clearly
sided with Ricci in the internal Jesuit dispute, claiming that “nothing prevents us from
thinking well of the ancient doctrines until we are compelled to proceed in any other
ways.”65
In his 1716 letter to Remond, Leibniz superficially maintained his usual support for
Ricci. Close to the start of his treatise, he advised against repudiating Chinese
cosmology, because “[it] would be highly foolish and presumptuous on our part, having
newly arrived compared with them, and scarcely out of barbarism, to want to condemn
such an ancient doctrine simply because it does not appear to agree at first glance with
our ordinary scholastic notions.”66 It was reasonable, he suggested, “to inquire whether
we could give it a proper meaning.”67 Here, as in his habitual promotion of the new in
the name of the old in his own metaphysical thinking, he was reminiscent of Ricci, but
the Jesuit father read monotheism into Confucianism for the purpose of subverting it
while Leibniz lined Confucianism up with Christianity for the different purpose of
deflecting criticism from both it and himself.
Longobardi, for instance, disputed Ricci’s identification of the Chinese Heaven with
the Christian God by mentioning how the Neo-Confucian Li “is the natural law of
Heaven and by its operation all things are governed, according to weight and measure,
and conforming to their state; not, however, on the basis of intelligence or reflection,
but only by propensity and natural order.”68 In response, Leibniz did not distinguish
ancient Confucianism from Neo-Confucianism as Ricci would have done. Instead, he
simply embraced the Confucian and Neo-Confucian idea of Tian (Heaven) or Li
(principle) by pointing out its similarity to his metaphysical innovation. “For me,” as
he said, “I find all this quite excellent and quite in accord with natural theology.”69 “It
is pure Christianity,” as he said in a different place, “insofar as it renews the natural law
inscribed in our hearts—except for what revelation and grace add to it to improve our
nature.”70
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Without hesitation, he included Neo-Confucianism in his approval. “Thus one can even
find satisfaction with modern Chinese interpreters, and commend them,” as he said,
“since they reduce the governance of Heaven and other things to natural causes and
distance themselves from the ignorance of the masses, who seek out supernatural
miracles—or rather super-corporeal ones—as well as seek out Spirits like those of a
Deus ex Machina.”71
Leibniz’s iconoclastic view of the world as organic rather than mechanistic or vitalistic
was indeed uncannily similar to the cosmology of China including Confucianism and
Neo-Confucianism, but precisely because they so much resembled each other, his
metaphysical innovation could not be Christian in character as he claimed or as scholars
of him have so far generally followed him in taking it to be.
Conclusion
One of the things which Leibniz in his long 1716 letter cited Longobardi as saying about
Confucianism was the idea of an esoteric or secret doctrine. Leibniz showed no trust
in Longobardi on this issue, but the idea of a contrast between a well-hidden private
belief and a well-advertised public conviction seems to be most apt and illuminating
about Leibniz’s metaphysical thinking and about his interest in China.
In public, he never stopped prompting others to see him as a great conciliator who
brought the mechanistic worldview of Cartesianism and the vitalistic cosmology of
Platonism and Neo-Platonism together under the theocentric umbrella of the best
possible world. In reality, in the name of resuscitating moribund old ideas from his
intellectual heritage he quietly and iconoclastically promoted his brave new vision of
the world as organic.
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Similarly, he appeared in public to be as much motivated in his interest in China by
international politics or by what Yuen-Ting Lai calls “a grandiose vision of a worldsociety, to be realized by the elimination of Islam, the conversion of China and Tartary,
and the reconciliation of Protestants and Catholics in Europe”72 as in his famous or
notorious Egyptian Plan which he concocted around 1672 with his friend Johannes
Christian von Boineburg (1622-1672) for the purpose of diverting the aggressive urge
of Louis XIV (1638-1715) from Holland. In reality, the most important connection of
him with China was the quiet absorption of the characteristically Chinese philosophical
idea of organism and the related Chinese monistic doctrine of tianren heyi (humanity’s
unity with heaven) which, as the noted 20th century Chinese scholar Qian Mu contends,
“constitutes the greatest contribution of Chinese culture to mankind.”73 In relation to
what he was in private, what Leibniz appeared in public was rarely more than smoke
and mirrors. To understand the real and radical import of his metaphysical thinking and
his inspirational debt to China in this regard, it seems crucially important to recognize
this fact.
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